Projects
Published
- Scientific Disagreement, Fast Science, and Higher-Order Evidence (w/ Dunja Šešelja). Forthcoming in Philosophy of Science.
- Paper on intentions and inquiry (title redacted for review): Defends an approach to understanding inquiry that draws on intentions to answer questions. Shows this approach can offer compelling grounding for controversial zetetic norms.
- Paper on shared inquiry (title redacted for review): Motivates and solves a puzzle about shared inquiry. Explains the epistemological significance of inquiring with others and articulates a new way to understand normative defeat.
- Paper on cooperation and epistemology (title redacted for review): Unpacks and defends a central norm of inquiring-together owed to Harman (1986). In so doing, sheds light on the epistemic impact of cooperative ties, and the connection of our inquiring together, to group belief.
- Paper on modeling shared agency at various levels (title redacted for review): Develops and defends a reductive and parsimonious account of massive and diffuse institutional agency and attitudes, by appeal to the attitudes in agents’ heads.
- “Against Epistemic Nihilism” (draft available): Are norms of inquiry genuinely epistemic? Nihilists say no: there are no epistemic norms of inquiry, thus no need for revolution to the canons of epistemic normativity(Thorstad, 2022). However, discussion has concerned only norms for individual inquirers. When we turn to norms for group inquiry, we can see why nihilists are mistaken.
- “Zetetic Rights and Wrongs” (draft in progress): What do we owe those with whom we inquire? Presumably, quite a bit. Anything beyond what is necessary to secure knowledge? Yes. I argue for a class of “zetetic rights” rights distinctive to group inquirers. Zetetic rights protect impor-tant central interests of inquirers (Raz, 1984). Drawing on arguments by Fricker (2015), I defend these rights, and explore the cases in which they are violated: zetetic wronging. Zetetic wronging is distinctive, pervasive, and merits further attention.
- “Doing Away with Normative Defeat (Zetetically)” (draft in progress): Sometimes the epistemic status of our beliefs is responsive to evidence we “should have had.” Or, so argue normative defeat theorists. Here, I offer an improved explanation of this phenomenon by appeal to shared inquiry. The expectations which affect evidence we should have had are explained by norms enjoining us to accommodate the evidence of our co-inquirers. Otherwise, our beliefs will be epistemically irrational.
- “Embracing HAL: Joint Inquiry and AI” (draft in progress) I put to work tools from epistemology and action theory alongside results in social robotics and cooperative AI to develop a model of joint inquiry with AI. Inquiring together with AI will require new forms of responsiveness and stringent pressure towards increased collaboration. Such inquiry, however, can help compensate for some pernicious epistemic blind-spots.
- “Expert Judgment: Overlooked Epistemic Reasons” w/ Dunja Šešelja & Will Fleisher (under review, invited contribution to The Epistemology of Expert Judgement, Routledge): We argue that simple evidentialist models of expert judgment are inadequate. Expert judgment must be informed by higher-order evidence and inquisitive reasons to play its social and epistemic function.